Volume 39
Issue 3 Summer 1999
Summer 1999

Gaining Access to Water: Formal and Working Rules of
Indigenous Irrigation Management on Mount Kilimanjaro,
Tanzania
Mary E. Gillingham

Recommended Citation
Mary E. Gillingham, Gaining Access to Water: Formal and Working Rules of Indigenous Irrigation
Management on Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, 39 Nat. Resources J. 419 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol39/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

MARY E. GILLINGHAM

Gaining Access to Water: Formal and
Working Rules of Indigenous
Irrigation Management on Mount
Kilimanjaro, Tanzania
ABSTRACT
Using the example of indigenous irrigationon Mount Kilimanjaro,
Tanzania,this paper illustrates that operatingbeneath the formal
rules of irrigationorganizationis a series of "working rules" that
people use to actually obtain access to water. It is argued that one
of the reasons that indigenous irrigationsystems are sustainable
and flexible is because the working rules allow water users to
adjust theirformal water right to an amount and timing of water
that matches their needs more closely. If interventions into
indigenous irrigationsystems are to be effective and sustainable,
and not undermine the institutionswhich govern water use within
the irrigationsystem concerned, then development agencies need
to understand,work with, and work through the working rules.
This paper considers ways in which this may be achieved.
INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that the management of an indigenous
irrigation system' is complex and how the system "should" work is
different from the way it "really" works.2 If several people using a
particular irrigation system are asked how the irrigation system is
managed, they will all give the same answer, establishing for the researcher
how the system should work. However, if any one person is asked how he

Mary Gillingham has completed her Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Geography,
University of Cambridge, and isnow working as a consultant in Tanzania. She may be
contacted through Local Perspective, P.O. Box 5085, Dar es Salaam.
1.

An irrigation system is defined as the physical and social infrastructure (rules and

procedures) that ensum the operation of the technology involved and the delivery of water.
See LINDEN VINCENT, HLL IRRIGATION: WATER AND DEVELPMENr INMOUNrAN AGRICUMM
34 (1995). An indigenous irrigation system is where irrigation technology is controlled,

disseminated, and applied by the people who use the system. See WvM ADAM, WASTING THE
RAIN: Rm , PEOPLE AND PLANNING IN AFUCA 70-76 (1992).
2. See Robert C. Hunt & Eva Hunt, Canal Irrigationand Local Social Organization,17
CURRENT ANnPROPOLOGY 389 (1976); VINCENT, sura note 1, at 117; William K. Adams et aL,
Water, Rules and Gemder Water Rights in an Indigenous IrrigationSystem, Marnkuet, Kenya, 28
DEV. & CHANGE 707 (1997).
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or she personally meets his or her water needs from that system, a very
different answer is obtained, and that answer will vary according to who

is answering the question.
Structural-functionalist models' of irrigation systems have
dominated the understanding of how irrigation systems are organized and
are used to identify what should happen in terms of irrigation organization. Based on comparative studies of indigenous irrigation systems
throughout the world, they attempt to identify the repeatable and
predictable regularities in organizational structure. Structural-functionalist
models identify the key organizational tasks within an irrigation system
that need to be fulfilled. Coward's4 model identifies three basic organizational tasks: physical maintenance of the system, allocation of water, and
conflict management. Uphoff'se "irrigation systems activities matrix"
builds on Coward's three basic tasks, also dividing activities into three
groups: physical system activities (which include maintenance), water use
activities (which include allocation of water), and organizational activities
(which include conflict management and leadership). This matrix has been
used to develop guidelines for the rapid rural appraisal of irrigation
systems.' The use of a rapid appraisal schedule identifies what are referred
to here as the "formal rules" of irrigation organization. The models are also
used as the basis for constructing "water user associations" to govern
farmer-managed irrigation schemes.
These structural-functionalist models have been criticized for
ignoring any macro-level or micro-level political dimension.7 At the macro
level, the models do not incorporate the objectives of irrigation organizations. This is critical because objectives of resource users and resource
managers may differ. Irrigation and water management advisors usually
aim to increase crop yields and allocate water with maximum economic
efficiency. In contrast, water users in Sub-Saharan Africa usually aim to
minimize risk and establish collective security of a water supply. At the

3. See E. Walter Coward, Jr., Principlesof Social Organizationin an Indigenous Irrigation
System, 38 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 28, 29 (1979); N. UPHOWF, IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT WITH FARMER PArrIcPATION, GEITING THE PROCESS RIGiT 37-53,
161-67 (1986).

4. See Coward, supra note 3.
5. See UPHOFF, supra note 3, at 42.
6.

See Prachanda Pradhan et al., Guidelines for Rapid Appraisal of Irrigation Systems:

Experience from Nepal (1987) (research paper for a national seminar, IJMI, IAAS) (Bharatpur,
Nepal).
7. See Robert C. Hunt, Appropriate Social Organisation? Water User Associations in
BureaucraticCanal Irrigation Systems, 48 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 79 (1989); VINCENr, supranote
1.
8. See Linden Vincent, SustainableSmall Scale IrrigationDevelopment Issues ForFarmers,
Governmentsand Donors,6 INr'LJ.WATER RESOURCES DEV. 250 (1990).
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micro level, the models fail to account for individual water needs within
the system as they identify a set of standardized rules by which it is
assumed the system works.9 The group of people using a particular
irrigation system is heterogeneous in terms of area of land to be irrigated,
crops grown, alternative sources of income to agriculture, and household
size and composition. As a result, each individual water user has different
water requirements and individuals' water needs cannot be met through
the standardized, formal rules of irrigation organization as identified by the
models of irrigation organization.
These problems with the structural-functionalist models of
irrigation organization can be answered by the use of concepts from New
Institutional Economics, which add the "real world of actual environmental
behaviours""0 to studies of natural resource management. Ostrom defines
institutions as sets of "working rules," which are those rules actually used,
monitored, and enforced when individuals in a given situation make
choices about the actions they will take." They may or may not closely
follow the formal rules expressed in legislation, administrative regulations,
and court decisions. Working rules include extensions, elaborations and
modifications of formal rules, socially sanctioned norms of behavior,
internally enforced codes of conduct, and social conventions. In the
example of indigenous irrigation systems, the formal rules are those
identified by the structural-functionalist models of irrigation organization
as what "should" happen. The working rules are the rules that individual
water users follow to actually gain access to water. It is these working rules
which determine what "really happens" in terms of maintenance of the
system, conflict management, and access to water.
This paper investigates the formal rules of water allocation at the
organizational level and the working rules which people use to gain access
to water at the individual household level within an indigenous irrigation
system on Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. It is argued that, although the
working rules of access to water make the irrigation system complex, they
also make it flexible and sustainable. Through the working rules, water
users can renegotiate their formal water right in order to obtain an amount
and timing of water that is more suited to their individual needs. Because
individual users can meet their water needs, they contribute to the duties
attached to membership of an irrigation system such as system mainte-

9. See VINCEM, supra note 1, at 94.
See Michael Jacobs, The Limits to Neodassialism:ToTwlrs an Instiutonal Envbmnental
Economics, in SOCIALTHEOwy ANDTH EEvItow
67 (Michael Redfift & Ted Benton eds.,
10.

1994).
11.

See EuLNOR OSROM, GOVERNmiG THE COMMONS: Te EvoW1Io OF brrfloNs FOR

COLLECrIV AcTION 51 (1990).
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nance. Each member of a resource user group has different resource needs
and as a result the use of working rules differs between users. Also, each
member has a differing ability to use the working rules, depending on
knowledge of the working rules, social and economic position, and so on,
which ultimately affects the amount of water that household is able to
obtain.
Knowledge about how indigenous irrigation systems work is
crucial to the success of any external development interventions into these
systems. Such interventions are increasingly common throughout Africa
because of the need to increase food production and increase the efficiency
of water use in order to release water for downstream users.' Having
established the existence of working rules, this paper considers the ways
in which working rules may be useful in helping development agencies
and policy makers address the complexity of indigenous irrigation systems.
METHODOLOGY
Research was conducted over 14 months in 1994/95, focusing on
four specific irrigation systems in the Hai District of the Kilimanjaro Region
(figure 1). For simplicity and conciseness, this paper focuses on just one of
these irrigation systems, called "Nshara Furrow." Rapid Rural Appraisal
techniques were used to acquire basic information about the social,
economic, political, and resource use characteristics of the user groups, and
the set of formal rules governing irrigation organization. The "user group"
was defined as the households that have land along Nshara Furrow, even
if they do not irrigate that land. Households that do not irrigate their land
were included because, in a study that investigates how people gain access
to water, the reasons why a particular household does not irrigate may be
significant. This was followed by a socio-economic questionnaire survey
of each household within the user group. Information collected included
household composition, land holdings, crops grown, wealth, and sources
of income.
The survey provided a census from which it was possible to
randomly choose households for further qualitative interviews. The first 29
households for qualitative interview were selected randomly while the last
28 households were chosen selectively in order to supplement the sample
with households with particular characteristics such as being femaleheaded. Fifty-seven out of a total of 91 households identified in the socioeconomic survey were interviewed qualitatively.

12. See D.C. Funnell, nterentionAnd IndigenousManagement The Geography Of Small Satle
IrrigationDevelopment In Morocco and Swaziland, 11 LAND USE POL'Y 45 (1994).
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Qualitative interviews addressed the water needs of each
household, how these needs were met, and factors which they felt
advantaged or disadvantaged that particular person or household in their
attempts to gain access to water. Such information from different households made it possible to establish how people really gained access to
water, and which means of access were available to different people.
Research was conducted at the household level because this was the unit
to which the formal rules allocate water, and the unit at which there is a
concern to get sufficient water onto the shared plot of land. Intra-household differences in access to water (notably gender) were addressed by
interviewing different household members within households selected for
qualitative interview.
It was found that there were differences in the use of, and access
to, water between men and women within a household. In general, the
system organization was dominated by men's water requirements. The
issue of intra-household access to water is extensive and will not be
addressed here.'
INDIGENOUS IRRIGATION ON MOUNT KILIMANJARO,
TANZANIA

The main settled area on Mount Kilimanjaro is the "upland"
between 1,000 and 2,000 meters above sea-level, where there are approximately 900 persons per square kilometer, with an average kihamba14
(homestead) size of 0.2 hectares. 15 Contemporary resource management
techniques on Kilimanjaro include agroforestry, irrigation, and stall-based
cattle feeding. At the core of the agroforestry system (found in the upland
area above 1,000 m) is coffee and banana cultivation. Around two-thirds of
households also have a lowland (below 1,000 m) shamba plot where they
grow seasonal maize and beans. Since the 1950s, population pressure has
resulted in the settlement of, and the extension of the irrigation system to,
the lowland area. This paper focuses on the upland irrigation system alone,

13.

See Mary Elizabeth Gillingham, Gaining Access To Water Indigenous Irrigation on

Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania passim (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Cambridge).
14.

Words in Kimachame, the local language in the field area, are given in italics.

15. See A.J. Lema, Land Degradationin Loa Communities on the Southern Slopes of lke sic]
Kilimanjaro:Towards a Social Science Explanation and Prospectsfor SustainableDevelopment, in
TANZANIAN PEASANMY: FURTHER STUDIES 95, 100 (P. Forster & S. Maghimbi eds., 1995).
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since the newer lowland irrigation systems were found to work differently
than those in the upland.16
The irrigation system on Kilimanjaro is a "canal network system"'7
in which water is distributed from source to farmland by dams and

channels. There are several examples of these irrigation systems in East
Africa, including those in Kerio Valley and Taita Hills in Kenya; and Sonjo,
Mount Kilimanjaro, Mount Meru, Usambara Mountains, and Pare

Mountains in Tanzania. They are usually referred to as "furrow" irrigation
systems." On Kilimanjaro, it is estimated that there are over 500 indigenous

irrigation furrows, with approximately 1,800 km of main channels
abstracting 200 million m 3/year.' 9 Each village in upland Kilimanjaro

(800-2000 m) is served by four to seven furrows, each serving 10-300
households.
This paper focuses on Nshara Furrow, which is typical of the
majority of furrows found in upland Kilimanjaro. The layout of Nshara
Furrow is illustrated in figure 2. The furrow begins with an intake made of
logs, mud, and stones, which diverts water from the Makoa River into the
furrow. The intake is susceptible to erosion by the river and, therefore,
requires regular maintenance. With the first big rainstorm of the long rains
(March-June) the intake is washed away and the furrow is left dry until it
is rebuilt at the end of the long rains. From the intake, the channel
gradually leads the water away from the river. The channel runs parallel
to the river, gradually leading the water to the top of the steep valley side.
The channel is an unlined earth canal of approximately 0.4 meters in depth
and one meter in width. The average volume of water entering the furrow
is between 40 and 60 liters per second, depending on the volume of water
in the river. Where the furrow crosses steep ravines or other furrows, water
is transported across by ilalo (aqueducts) made from hollowed out trees,
banana plant stems, or corrugated iron sheeting. When the furrow reaches
flatter ground, it branches into three diversions with smaller channels
(approximately 15 cm deep and 50 cm wide), which sub-divide to lead to
each individual kihamba. The discharge of water decreases as water is
diverted away or lost through seepage, leaving the ends of the channels

16. See Mary Elizabeth Gillingham, Extending Upland Irrigation to Lowland Areas: The
Example of Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the

author).
17. See VINCENT, supranote 1.
18. See R. Soper, A Survey of IrrigationSystems of the Marakwet, in, KE1UO VALLEY: PAST,
PREsENt AND FuTu'RE 75-95 (B.E. Kipkorir et al. eds., 1981) (proceedings of a seminar at
Institute Of African Studies, University of Nairobi); W.M. Adams et al., Indigenous FarmerManagedIrrigation in Sonjo, Tanzania,160 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 17,19 (1994).

19. See 1 MINSTRY OF WATER , ENERGY AND MINERALS, WATER MASTER PLAN:
KILIMANJARO REGION 3 (1977) (United Republic of Tanzania).
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Figure 2. Sketch Map or Nshara Furrow.
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dry. If surplus water reaches the ends of the channels, it drains into the
next furrow (Mondri Furrow or the Estate Furrow) or back to the river.
Near the top-end of Nshara Furrow there is an additional supply of water
from Ikola Furrow, from which surplus water enters Nshara Furrow.
The key uses of furrow water are for irrigation and domestic
purposes. The furrow runs past each one of the 97 kihamba it serves,
therefore providing a convenient source of water for domestic uses since
there is no tap water in this area. Swynnerton, Masao, 21 and Grove, in
their studies of Kilimanjaro, all discuss the importance of furrows in
providing a domestic water supply, and argue that the supply of water for
domestic use may have been the primary purpose of the furrows when
they were originally built about two hundred years ago. The main irrigated
crops are bananas, coffee, and vegetables. Bananas and coffee require
irrigation every six to eight weeks (depending on the arrival of, and extent
of, the short rains in November or December), and vegetables every one to
three days. During irrigation, water is diverted onto sections of the plot by
a series of rivulets made by a hoe. The water is allowed to run freely over
the soil until the soil is saturated. Both men and women can irrigate, but in
male-headed households it is usually the male's responsibility to apply for
the allocation and to actually undertake the irrigation of coffee and banana
plants. Irrigating vegetables is generally considered to be women's work.
FORMAL RULES OF FURROW ORGANIZATION
Each furrow on Kilimanjaro has a leader called the "Furrow
Chairman," who is responsible for the organization of furrow maintenance
and water allocation, and for imposing punishments on rule-breakers. The
position is elected from the group of direct male descendants of the man
who originally founded the furrow. The Chairman is elected for life, or
until he is too sick or too old to be able to undertake the work. This was
found to be the way in which most of the Furrow Chairmen in upland
Kilimanjaro were chosen, although some inherit the position, while there
were some who were elected from a Clan other than that of the original
founder of the furrow.
The physical nature of the furrow means that it requires regular
maintenance if it is to remain functional. The "annual cleaning" takes place
in late June or July, when the long rains ease. The channels are scraped

20.

R.J.M. Swynnerton, Some Problems of the Chagga on Kilimanjaro, 14 EAST AFRICAN

AGRIC.J. 117,124-26 (1949).
21. Fidelis T. Masao, The IrrigationSystem in Uchagga: An Ethno-HistoricalApproach, 75
TANZANIA NOTES & RECORiS 1 (1974).

22.. Alison Grove, Water Use by the Chagga on klimanjaro, 92 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 431 (1993).
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clean of vegetation, any landslides along the course of the furrow (usually
in the head reaches where the furrow traverses steep valley sides) are
repaired, and the intake is rebuilt. This work can take two to three weeks,
depending on the extent of damage caused by the long rains. If the short
rains (the end of November or December) are heavy, the intake may need
to be rebuilt. The intake and head reaches of the furrow require regular
maintenance throughout the dry season. The household whose allocation
it is on any one day is expected to walk the length of the furrow before
irrigating, repairing any leaks as they develop. The Furrow Chairman
organizes work parties every one to two weeks to maintain the intake and
upper reaches of the furrow by packing more mud onto the retaining walls.
If there is no regular maintenance after the annual cleaning, the furrow
soon falls into disrepair and becomes dry. Thus, the labor requirement for
furrow maintenance is high, and the right to receive an allocation of water
for irrigation purposes (the formal water right) is based upon the contribution of labor to furrow maintenance. Each household using Nshara Furrow
is expected to send at least one male representative to furrow maintenance
work. Because it is taboo for women to participate in furrow maintenance,
female-headed households are excused from furrow work. However, if a
household is female-headed because the husband works away from
Kilimanjaro, the household is expected to pay for a laborer to do the work,
or give a cash contribution to the Furrow Chairman.
After the annual cleaning, the Furrow Chairman holds an
allocation meeting, during which the allocation sequence for the following
dry season is decided. Water is allocated from 6 AM to 6 PM to one
household, then to another household the next day. No one household
receives a second allocation until all other households within that furrow
user group have received an allocation of water. Water is allocated to a
household on one diversion for one day, then to a household on the second
diversion for the next day, and then to a household on the third diversion
on the third day. Water is left to run freely throughout the furrow from 6
PM to 6 AM so that women may have easy access to water for domestic uses
and for vegetable irrigation between these times. Water is not allocated on
Sundays, as the Christian day of rest is widely respected in Kilimanjaro,
where 90 percent of the population is Christian. 3 An allocation meeting is
held every Monday to confirm the allocation order for that week, to
provide an opportunity to discuss problems relating to the allocation
sequence, and to organize furrow maintenance.
Punishments are necessary to ensure that furrow users adhere to
the formal rules. Most disciplinary action occurs over non-attendance at
maintenance. The punishment for failing to send a representative to furrow

23.

See JOHN ILWp, A MODERN HuSoRY OF TANGANYIKA 54345 (1979).
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work is a fine called ifua. Those who attended the day's work visit the
defaulter's kihamba and take something deemed to be of the same value as
one day's labor. If a household continually fails to contribute to furrow
maintenance, that household is no longer allocated water for irrigation and
the diversion to their kihamba is filled in. If someone is caught taking water
for irrigation when water is allocated to someone else in the user group, the
fine is 2,000 Tanzanian Shillings (TSh) (U.S. $3.64).'
Therefore, each household with a plot along Nshara Furrow that
participates in furrow work receives an equal 12-hour allocation of water.
However, there is wide differentiation in water needs within the user
group. Because of scattered land ownership, 34 households with a plot of
land along Nshara do not actually live on that plot. Several such households do not actually irrigate their Nshara plot (and therefore do not need
to do furrow work for Nshara), while others only take water in very dry
years. There is also differentiation in the size of a plot (varying from 0.1 to
1.6 hectares) and in sources of income. Some households have no alternative source of income to agriculture, so need to maximize yields by
maximizing their access to irrigation water, while others having large offfarm incomes do not have the time or the need to maximize their access to
water. Four households in the Nshara user group have no one under 60
years of age and find irrigation difficult, but, because the household is
small, they do not need to maximize yields. Conversely, households with
several young children need not only to grow enough food to meet
subsistence needs but also need a surplus which can be sold to pay school
fees. There are 60 households with plots of land along Nshara Furrow that
regularly request an allocation, and each household can only receive an
allocation every ten weeks. However, most households want to irrigate
their plot every six to eight weeks. In order to obtain the desired frequency
of irrigation water, furrow users use alternative means of access to water,
which are governed by a series of working rules.
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESS TO WATER AND WORKING
RULES
For Nshara Furrow users there are five possible alternative means
of access to water. The first is to borrow water from the formal allocation
of friends and family along Nshara Furrow. The second is to divert water
from the upper furrow, Ikola Furrow. This can be done in three ways: by
diverting a formal allocation from Ikola Furrow (if the household in
question has access to an Ikola allocation), by borrowing water from the
Ikola allocation of a friend or relative, or by taking water at night. The third

24. AlU monetary values given at 1994 values.
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alternative means of access to water is to buy water from the allocation of
other Nshara Furrow users. The fourth is to irrigate at night when water is
not formally allocated to anyone, and the fifth is to steal water.
Borrowing Water
With an adequate volume of water in the furrow (over 40 liters per
second), 0.4 hectares of land takes seven or eight hours to irrigate. As most
households own less than 0.4 hectares, there are often several hours of an
allocation remaining after irrigation has been completed. This can be lent
to others who are in need of water. Borrowing is most common from
August to October, when there are relatively large volumes of water in the
furrow. By January the volume of water is low (especially if the short rains
have been poor) and most households need the full 12-hour allocation.
Borrowed water is used to irrigate vegetables or cattle feed grasses (which
require small amounts of water once or twice a week), as well as to irrigate
coffee and bananas if the soil is becoming dry but the formal allocation of
water is not yet due. Borrowing is common and 44 percent of the respondents obtained water in this way.
Water is borrowed by asking an allocation holder who does not use
the full 12 hours to irrigate their plot if it is possible to use the water that is
in the furrow once they have finished irrigating. Because of the weekly
allocation meetings, who holds the allocation on which day is common
knowledge. People ask neighbors for water first, as they are known to each
other (possibly they are relatives), there is no distance involved, and it is
easy to see when a neighbor has finished irrigating. The borrower may help
the lender irrigate, ensuring they finish early. Arrangements are often
reciprocal-if person A borrows from person B, person A will give person
B priority if he or she should need water when A has an allocation.
The key working rule governing borrowing is that anyone lending
water must only lend water to a household which contributes to furrow
work (and therefore has the right to water from the furrow) or to households which are formally excused from furrow work. This ensures that all
who are using the furrow are contributing to furrow work and that it is not
possible to "free-ride." Free-riding is when a person enjoys the benefits of
a resource management system (in this case water) without contributing to
the duties attached to the use of that system (participating in furrow work
and respecting other people's allocations of water). This is important
because several households not living on their Nshara Furrow plot borrow
water as and when they need it and do not actually apply for an allocation.
However, they still attend furrow work because they know that they will
not be lent water otherwise. The household lending water should lend
water freely, there being a strong belief that water is a freely given "gift
from God." Should furrow users obtain their full irrigation requirement by
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borrowing, they do not apply for an allocation, which shortens the
allocation cycle.
Not all furrow users are equally able to borrow. Those who find it
most difficult to borrow are households where the main irrigator (usually
the male head of household) has full-time employment and therefore has
little time to negotiate with other users for water. Ten respondents said that

they do not borrow water, as they are unable to reciprocate due to large
plot size or living at the tail end of the furrow where less water reaches the

plot and therefore it takes longer to irrigate. However, Chi-Squared tests
showed that the plot sizes of households borrowing water were signifi-

cantly larger (at the 95 percent confidence level) than for those households
not borrowing. This is because households with larger plots need more
water. Two female heads of households, recently married and with
husbands who work away, also find borrowing water difficult. They do not
know their neighbors well and are too shy to ask. Three other femaleheaded households that do not borrow water reported that other factors
are more significant in determining their ability to borrow (such as plot
size). Three of the eight female-headed households interviewed know their
neighbors well and have no trouble borrowing water as and when they
need to. Older men (over 30) find it easier to borrow water as they are
better known and respected in the area than younger men. Most respondents said that when they have surplus water they give priority to requests
from people who have lent them water, followed by older men and female
heads of household, because households with younger men are more able
to acquire water at night.
Diverting Water from lkola Furrow
Surplus water from Ikola Furrow drains into Nshara Furrow. It is
possible to divert all of the water from Ikola Furrow into Nshara Furrow
and use that water to irrigate a Nshara Furrow plot. Diverting water from
one furrow to another furrow serves to "top up" the volume of water
available for irrigation, especially in January and February. Ikola Furrow
is spring-fed and, therefore, flow in the furrow is reliable at the hottest,
driest time of year when flow in stream-fed furrows such as Nshara
Furrow is notoriously unreliable. In total, 32 percent of respondents use
Ikola water.
There are three ways in which water is diverted from Ikola Furrow
to Nshara Furrow. First, eight respondents who have plots along both
Nshara and Ikola Furrows transfer their Ikola allocation to Nshara Furrow.
They do furrow work for both furrows and, therefore, receive an allocation
for both furrows. For example, one household lives on a small plot along
Ikola Furrow, with only room for the house and a vegetable garden. Most
cultivation is done on their Nshara Furrow plot. If the volume of water in
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Nshara Furrow is low, they divert water from their Ikola allocation to
Nshara. It is necessary to negotiate with the Nshara Furrow allocation
holder for that day in order to share the water diverted into Nshara
Furrow. Whether a household is able to transfer water from an Ikola
allocation to Nshara Furrow is dependent only on having a plot along both
Nshara Furrow and Ikola Furrow and is independent of other household
characteristics, such as household composition. However, two households
with no plot along Ikola Furrow attend furrow work for Ikola Furrow and,
therefore, obtain an allocation there that is transferred to Nshara Furrow.
Both of the men involved in this transaction are in their 40s and 50s, wellknown to the Ikola Furrow Chairman, and widely respected by the other
members of Ikola Furrow. They are therefore allowed to contribute to Ikola
Furrow work and obtain an allocation without actually owning land there.
The second way to obtain Ikola water is to borrow water from a
person who holds an allocation there, which seven respondents do. The
working rule is that people from Nshara Furrow can take Ikola water
without doing furrow work as long as they borrow the water from the
allocation of someone who does do furrow work for Ikola Furrow. People
who most often do this are older men who are well known and respected
throughout the community, and households which live at the top end of
Nshara Furrow, and who are therefore neighbors with Ikola Furrow users.
The one female head of household obtaining water in this way has a
relative living along Ikola Furrow from whom she borrows water. Other
female-headed households reported that it is easier to borrow from within
the Nshara Furrow user group, as they do not know the men along Ikola
Furrow from whom they would be borrowing water.
The third way of obtaining water from Ikola Furrow is by taking
it at night. To take water from Ikola Furrow at night, all diversions of the
Ikola except the main channel have to be blocked in order to divert all the
water into Nshara Furrow. This is against the formal rules, as water should
flow in all diversions at night. It also contradicts formal rules if those taking
water at night do not do furrow work for Ikola Furrow. The formal rule of
not taking water from Ikola Furrow at night is enforced if an Ikola member
notices water being diverted to Nshara Furrow. However, as few like going
out at night, it is rare that anyone from Nshara Furrow is caught taking
water from Ikola Furrow. Because the formal rule is rarely enforced, it is
not a working rule and young men who are willing to go out at night are
able to take water from Ikola Furrow. All six households that admitted to
taking water in this way contain young men who are the ones who actually
do the night irrigation. The issue of night irrigation within Nshara Furrow
is addressed in more detail below.
Several respondents were aware that people take water from Ikola
Furrow but did not know how to obtain this water themselves. Some said
that they could ask other users or the Furrow Chairman how to get this
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water, but had not had need to do so as they manage to obtain water
through other means. Others believed that unless a person owns a plot or
has a relative along Ikola Furrow, there is no way to get water from Ikola.
If they took water at night and were caught, they would be fined. This
illustrates that not all furrow users have the same level of knowledge about
the working rules, which can, ultimately, affect their ability to gain access
to water.25
Buying Water
"Buying" water is defined as a cash exchange as a result of one
household being "lent" water by another. Strictly, this is against "formal
rules," as there is a strong belief throughout Kilimanjaro that water is a gift
from God and should be free for all to use. If someone does not want to
irrigate, they should not do furrow work but leave water for those who
really need it and not use furrow work as an indirect form of paid labor.
Four households admitted to buying water to meet their water requirements. All have higher than average plot size and grow surplus bananas
and vegetables for commercial purposes. Thus, buying water for these
households is a profitable investment. Also, although these households
also irrigate at night and take water from Ikola Furrow, they still need to
buy water in order to meet their water requirements.
The process of buying water is as follows: person B (the seller)
approaches household A offering to irrigate A's plot with B's allocation. A
then pays B for his labor to irrigate the plot rather than for the water per se.
This is within the rules, as it is person B's labor that is paid for, not his
water. Person B is given 500 to 1,500 TSh (U.S. $1.00 to $2.75) depending on
the length of time water is taken for and the time of year. If questioned as
to why A's plot is being irrigated when it is B's turn to irrigate, B explains
that he has lent water to A, but A is too busy to irrigate himself. As a good
friend of A's, he has offered to irrigate for him. If the Furrow Chairman
were to find out that a particular household was selling their allocation,
they would be stopped from using the furrow. The household purchasing
the water would go unpunished.
Therefore, either the buying and/or selling of water from the
allocation of someone in Nshara Furrow was not necessarily against the
working rules. It again illustrates that some people have greater knowledge
about the working rules than others. Most respondents stated that they did
not buy water, as it was against the rules to make a cash profit from water,
and if they were caught buying water the Furrow Chairman would
disallow their next allocation. However, four households were aware that

25. See Hunt & Hunt, supra note 2, at 390-92.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

it is the seller who is punished, not the buyer, and, if the seller can convince
anyone who may confront him that he is selling his labor, not his water,
then he too will go unpunished. In this respect, all of the households that
admitted to buying water contain someone with a leadership position (for
example, on the Village Committee), who would be more aware that it is
the household caught selling the water that is punished rather than the
household caught buying the water.
Night Irrigation within Nshara Furrow
Although it is against the formal rules of Nshara Furrow to irrigate
at night, 42 percent of respondents do so. Night irrigation means taking
water after dark (7 PM) until 12 PM or 1 AM, although in very dry years
people stay out until 6 AM. The majority of those who irrigate at night do
so most years from one to six times, depending on the severity of the
drought in the dry season. A few, notably female-headed households and
older people, will irrigate at night only in the driest years, while households containing young men will irrigate their plots at night on a more
regular basis. When people go out to irrigate at night they do so with
family or friends. Generally, people do not like going out at night to
irrigate, so those who can afford to pay someone else to do the work for
them do so. It is young men who are employed, as night irrigation is
considered a task for the young and strong. They are paid from 1,000 TSh
to 4,000 TSh (U.S. $1.80 to $7.27). Payment is made the next morning when
there is evidence of a successfully irrigated plot.
The working rule of night irrigation is that households taking
water at night should attend furrow work. It is also considered more
acceptable for tail-enders to irrigate at night than top-enders. This is
because water has already passed the majority of households, so when
water is diverted to a kihamba for irrigation, few households are affected.
However, in reality, top-enders are as likely to irrigate at night as tailenders. Only two female-headed households of the eight interviewed
irrigate at night. In one there is a teenage son who does the work, and, in
the other, a son that is working away sends money to his mother so she can
pay someone to irrigate at night for her. The other female heads of
household are too afraid to go out at night alone or do not have the money
to pay someone to do the work for them.
Stealing Water
There are two ways in which water is considered stolen. Firstly, if
someone takes water from the furrow for irrigation purposes when it is
another household's allocation but does not have their permission to use
that water, it is stealing. Secondly, if water is taken from the furrow for
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irrigation purposes without doing furrow work for that furrow, that too is
stealing. The stealing of water in either of these two ways in Nshara
Furrow is rare. Because of the high population density and open nature of
the furrows (the main diversions generally run parallel with pathways),
who is doing what with furrow water is highly visible. This, combined with
the fact that who has been allocated water on which day is common
knowledge, makes stealing difficult and rare. Even if water has been left to
run free in the furrow by the allocation holder before the end of their
allocation, anyone wanting the water will ask the allocation holder for
permission to use the water before taking it. Taking water from Nshara
Furrow without doing furrow work there is nearly impossible. Very little
water reaches the end of the furrow, so it is difficult for users of Monri
Furrow (into which Nshara drains) to take Nshara water in the same way
that Nshara users take Ikola water. Anyone within the user group who fails
to do furrow work is either punished through ifua (a fine), or, if they
continually fail to contribute, their diversion is blocked, and any of the
other furrow users seeing them irrigating will report them to the Furrow
Chairman. Therefore, the working rules reflect and reinforce the formal
rules, which do not allow people to take water without doing furrow work
or to take water from another person's allocation.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORKING RULES
It is clear that the formal rules of water allocation do not provide
a full explanation of how furrow users gain access to water. The fact that
75 percent of respondents use one or more alternative means of access to
water illustrates the importance of working rules in this regard. The
flexibility that the working rules provide is crucial to the allocative
efficiency and sustainability of the irrigation system. Through working
rules the majority of households obtain an amount and timing of water
which is more closely suited to their needs than their formal allocation. If
all furrow users were to be restricted to the use of their formal allocation
only, the furrow irrigation system would meet the irrigation water needs
of only a few furrow users. This would reduce the incentive to attend
furrow maintenance work and make the furrow more liable to run dry due
to cumulative leakages that have not been repaired as and when they
occurred.
However, knowledge of, and ability to benefit from, the working
rules varies between households. For example, households with young
men present find it easier to irrigate at night, while households with older
men present find it easier to borrow water. Only one of the eight female
heads of household interviewed does not use any alternative means of
access, but the other seven use only one alternative means of access each,
not having the time or ability to use two or three alternative means of
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access. In this respect, access to water within Nshara Furrow tends towards
equity, since those unable to use one particular alternative means of access
to water (such as night irrigation) are usually given priority in using
another alternative means of access to water (such as borrowing). As a
result, relatively disadvantaged households, such as female-headed
households, have some chance of adjusting their access to water. Those not
using any alternative means of access are mainly households living away
from their plot along Nshara Furrow who do not irrigate that plot, and
households with an alternative means of income to agriculture and
therefore not having such a strong need to maximize agricultural production as other households. Because different water users use different
working rules to different extents, it is not possible to say how an irrigation
system "really works" because each water user's reality is different.
The fact that the working rules of access to water for Nshara
Furrow reflect the basic principles of the formal rules also contributes to the
sustainability of the system. Firstly, in order to use the working rules (for
example, to borrow water), people still have to attend furrow work for
Nshara Furrow. Secondly, because stealing is against the working rules as
well as the formal rules, the formal allocation of water is reliable. If it were
not reliable, there would be less incentive to contribute to furrow work in
order to obtain an allocation. This cohesion between the formal and
working rules takes time to develop and is the result of decades of
continual negotiation.' The cohesion between the formal and working
rules in more recent (1950s) lowland furrows was found to be not as well
developed as in the upland. This was due to the more recent time scale,
drier climate, more scattered population, and greater social diversity in the
newly settled areas.'
It is important to be aware that the portfolio of working rules
changes with time. In the short-term, the use of working rules fluctuates
with the weather. For example, in a wet year when the rains continue
through to August or September, there is not so much need of irrigation,
so there is not so much need to borrow water, irrigate at night, and so on.
In a very dry year, water users may lobby the Furrow Chairman to
temporarily change the formal rules so that each allocation lasts only six
hours, ensuring each household receives some water before the streams
run dry. In the long-term, the increased number, but decreased size, of
plots has meant that borrowing has become more common over the past 40
years, while there have been no changes in the allocation system. Thus, it

26. Oral histories established that the oldest furrows on Kilimanjaro began in the 18th
century. The process of furrow building has been continuous, with new furrows being built
as new areas have been settled.
27. See Gillingham, supra note 16, at 6-7.
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is the working rules that slowly and incrementally adapt to changes in the
external social and economic environment rather than the formal rules.
From the example of indigenous irrigation on Kilimanjaro, it has
become apparent that indigenous irrigation management is complex and
of considerable depth. The concept of working rules developed from the
use of the language of New Institutional Economics is useful in describing
how the irrigation system on Mount Kilimanjaro works. However, it is
necessary to go beyond the descriptive level to consider what development
interventions into indigenous irrigation systems are taking place, and how
policy-makers and development agencies can account for the complexity
of indigenous irrigation management in their work.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND WORKING RULES
Current development interventions into indigenous irrigation on
Mt. Kilimanjaro are focused around river basin management initiatives that
aim to reduce the amount of water used upstream, releasing more water
for downstream uses-most notably for hydroelectric power generation,
but also for lowland irrigation and urban water supply. With respect to the
indigenous furrows, the policy is to increase the efficiency of water use,
thereby reducing the amount of water abstracted by the furrow systems.'
The policy includes the introduction of statutory water rights for each
furrow with a concomitant annual water user fee (WUF) based on the total
volume of water abstracted by a furrow in a year. The aim of the WUF is
to achieve cost recovery for the River Basin Authority as well as to make
water users aware of the economic value of the water they are using.
Previously, the indigenous furrows were considered to have a "traditional"
water right, which was held on behalf of the furrow users by the District
Council. The introduction of statutory water rights and WUFs for
indigenous furrows requires the formalization of furrow management into
a legally recognized entity such as a Water User Association (WUA). The
WUA is then responsible for collecting the money for the statutory water
right (a one-time payment of 35,000 TSh or U.S. $64.00) and a water user fee
(30 TSh or U.S. $0.05 for every 100m 3),' as well as ensuring that the volume

28. See Gillingham, supra note 13.
29. The initial rates set in 1994 were ISh 40,000 (U.S. $72.70) for the application fee and
TSh 15 (US. $0.03) for every lOOm 3.These rates were revised to the ones given above in 1996

because the high application fee was thought to be discouraging furrow users from applying
for a statutory right. However, the WUF was increased so that the water management
authorities could still recover their costs. See Gillingham, supra note 13; Mary E Gillingham,
Imposing Efficiency: Indigenous Irrigation and State Water Management, Kilimanjaro, J. INT'L
COMMISSION IRRIGATN &DRAINAGE (forthcoming 2000) (Netherlands).
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of water abstracted by the furrow they manage does not exceed the amount
stated in the statutory water right.
To date there have been few external interventions into the
indigenous irrigation system on Mount Kilimanjaro because it has been felt
that the irrigation furrows have been well-managed and efficient in terms
of meeting the water needs of the local people. The current attempts to
introduce statutory laws and fees to indigenous furrow users will add a
new dimension to the organization of the irrigation system. If the initiatives
are not sensitive to the way the furrows are managed at present, they may,
at best, be ignored by furrow users as irrelevant to the way in which the
furrow currently operates, or, at worst, they may undermine the indigenous formal and working rules that ensure that the system is sustainable
and flexible.
Therefore, if development interventions such as the one described
above are to be successful and sustainable, development agencies must
understand, work with, and work through the working rules. The first step
in addressing the complexity of indigenous irrigation systems is to develop
research strategies that allow development agencies to begin to understand
how an irrigation system "really" works. Irrigation systems are far more
complex than rapid rural appraisal itineraries for irrigation systems that
identify "formal rules" would suggest. Ways of obtaining more detailed
information about the working rules of an irrigation system are needed. To
identify the working rules it is necessary to ask different groups of users
(top-enders and tail-enders, men and women, young and old, rich and
poor) how they personally gain access to the water they require under
different circumstances (when there is drought, when water is plentiful,
when the male head of household is working away, and so on). By asking
different users within a system what their water needs are and how they
meet those needs, it should be possible to establish what the working rules
are, who is able to benefit from which working rules, and the extent to
which the working rules reflect the formal rules. This research will take
time (over one year). This is because research needs to cover at least one
complete agricultural cycle (while being aware that there can be dramatic
fluctuations in weather patterns between years); it takes time to develop
water users' confidence in telling the researcher what they "really do" to
obtain access to water; and it takes time for the researcher to develop a
good understanding of the social, political, and economic context in which
the irrigation system is operating.
An essential part of the research process is the development of
communications between the development agency and water users. These
communications are important in ensuring that water users participate in
deciding whether an external intervention into the irrigation system is
appropriate, and, if so, what the intervention should involve. Detailed
group and individual interviews with different sections of the user group
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should address the problems that they, as individuals, face in gaining
access to water; how they personally think that the irrigation system can be
improved, if at all; the aims of the research and any subsequent projects
involving the irrigation system; and how these aims might be met in a way
that would be mutually beneficial to both parties. It may also be relevant
to include different user groups such as upstream farmers and downstream
hydroelectric power engineers in discussions."
The water users themselves need to participate in the decision as
to whether an external intervention is actually appropriate. Wade31
suggests that collective action situations (where resource users work
together to use and manage the resource in question sustainably, such as
with indigenous irrigation systems) have a better chance of success where
there is minimal external interference, especially from the state. Ili-advised
interventions will, at best, be ignored by the water users as inappropriate,
and at worst may undermine the working rules that ensure that the system
is sustainable, resulting in the collapse of the irrigation system. If an
external agency were to undertake to decrease water losses along Nshara
Furrow-thereby releasing water for downstream users-by lining the
furrow with cement, furrow users may see the agency as having become
responsible for the maintenance of the physical infrastructure. This will
result in a decline in water user participation in system maintenance, and
after the agency involvement in the system has finished, the cement
structures (and possibly the whole system) will fall into disrepair.
Intervention should only take place if there is general agreement among
different sections of the water user group that there are improvements that
could be made to the system with which an external agency could assist,
and if the external agency itself feels that this is so. For example, with the
relatively successful Netherlands Development Organization "Traditional
Irrigation Programme" in Tanzania, assistance has only been given if there
has been a request from the user group themselves.
If the mutual decision is made that the development agency should
intervene, there needs to be negotiation between the aims of the development agency and the aims of water users. The water users themselves need
to continue as an integral part of the project. It might be necessary to
develop new fora for negotiations that involve different sectors of the user
group. For example, if there were to be external interventions into Nshara

30. See Gillingham, supra note 29.
31. See ROBERT WADE, VILLAGE RapusUcs: ECONoMIc CoNDmoNs FOR CoLLcivE
AcrIoN INSourTH INDia 179-98 (1988).
32. See generally Lisa Oakes, Social/Cultural and Environmental Aspects of Irrigation
Development (1996) (unpublished M. Phil. thesis, University Of Cambridge) (on file with the
author).
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Furrow, it would be unwise to base communications around formal furrow
meetings, as women do not attend these meetings. Thus, it would be
necessary to use pre-existing, or create new, women's groups in order to
develop and maintain communications with this sector of the user group
after the initial research about working rules had been completed., It is
essential to include all members of the user group in the decision making
process since water needs within the user group can be in conflict, and,
therefore, it is important to ensure that any interventions do not benefit one
group (usually the more prolific elite, such as wealthy, educated men who
are well able to express their needs and desires to people from outside the
community) at the expense of other users.' Through continual research,
communication, negotiation and participation the mutually decided aims
of the project will have a greater chance of becoming an integral part of the
working rules.
As with any development project, constant monitoring and
evaluation of impacts will be needed. Knowledge of the working rules can
assist greatly in this process. Research throughout the lifetime of the project
should help to establish how the intervention is altering the working rules
that govern people's daily water use. This will include identifying the
direction in which change is occurring, which sectors of the user group are
benefiting the most from the changes, and if there are any sectors of the
user group which are being disadvantaged by the changes. There will then
be a need to respond to any problems identified, again through negotiation
and participation. Therefore, any external intervention cannot be based on
a blueprint plan but has to be adaptive and responsive.
There will also have to be a long-term commitment to the project
of decades rather than years as the processes of research, negotiation, and
monitoring cannot be hurried. Neither can the changes in the working rules
that such a project might aim to achieve be rushed, since changes to the
working rules, by their very nature, are gradual and incremental. The
projects may also be small in scale. This is because each water user group
is unique in terms of social composition, physical location, infrastructure,
and working rules, and, therefore, each water user group has to be taken
as an individual case. For example, with any intervention into the irrigation
systems on Mount Kilimanjaro, each furrow user group would have to be
researched separately in order to identify the vulnerable sections of the
user group, physical infrastructural problems, and the working rules; to
build up communications with different sections of the user group; to
establish if external intervention is desirable; and to develop a project
strategy. However, in aggregate a large number of small-scale projects can
have a significant impact.

33. See Adams et al., supranote 18, at 30-31.
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The flexibility and sustainability provided by a set of working rules
is also an important consideration in the construction of water user
associations for the management of farmer-managed irrigation systems.
Water user associations are modeled on the structural-functionalist models
of irrigation organization and are, therefore, designed with a standardized
set of formal rules to ensure that organization. From the example of Nshara
Furrow, it is apparent that within these farmer-managed irrigation systems
there needs to be room for working rules to develop, as it is not possible to
predict every water user's water requirements at every moment in time.
However, in a newly established management regime, it may take time for
sets of working rules to develop. Fora for negotiation between water users
may help the development of working rules, as well as ensure that they
develop in a direction that ensures compliance with the basic principles of
the formal rules, rather than undermining or contradicting them.
CONCLUSION
Models of irrigation organization based on studies of indigenous
irrigation systems identify the formal rules of what "should" happen.
However, operating beneath the formal rules in an indigenous irrigation
system are sets of working rules that determine how the irrigation system
"really" works for an individual water user at a particular moment in time.
Working rules are crucial to the flexibility and sustainability of an irrigation
system. Current policies for improving the efficiency of water use upstream
in order to release water for increasing demand downstream will continue
into the future. If these policies are to be successful, there is a need to take
the concept of working rules seriously, and to consider ways of working
with and through them. If the working rules are not researched and are not
considered as an integral part of a project, at best, the project will be
ignored by the water users as irrelevant to their daily water needs and
practices, and, at worst, it may undermine the institutions which ensure the
sustainability of the system. However, by considering the complexity of an
irrigation system, and by working with and through the working rules, any
intervention which is decided to be appropriate to undertake will be more
relevant to water users' needs and their own institutions, and, therefore,
will ultimately be more sustainable.

